An analytical model of a team of well-trained human decisionmakers executing well-defined decisionmaking tasks is presented. Each team member is described by a two-stage model in which received information is first assessed and then responses are selected. An information theoretic framework is used in which bounded rationality is modeled as a constraint in the total rate of internal processing by each decisionmaker. Optimizing and satisficing strategies are derived and their properties analyzed in terms of organizational performance and individual workload. The relevance of this approach to the design and evaluation of command control and communications (C 3 ) systems is discussed. Abstract. An analytical model of a team of well-trained human decisionmakers executing well-defined decisionmaking tasks is presented. Each team member is described by a two-stage model in which received information is first assessed and then responses are selected. An information theoretic framework is used in which bounded rationality is modeled as.a constraint on the total rate of internal processing by each decisionmaker. Optimizing and satisficing strategies are derived and their properties analyzed in terms of organizational performance and individual workload. The relevance of this approach to the design and evaluation of command control and communications (C3) systems is discussed.
INTRODUCTION
maker and of the organization. Information 3 theoretic approaches to modeling human de-A command control and communications (C ) syscisionmakers have a long history (Sheridan tem is defined as the collection of equipment and Ferrell, 1974) . The basic departure and procedures used by commanders and their from previous models is in the modeling of staff to process information, arrive at decithe internal processing of the inputs to sions, and communicate these decisions to the produce outputs. This processing includes appropriate units in the organization in a not only transmission (or throughput) but timely manner. Implicit in this definition is also internal coordination, blockage, and the notion that the role of the human decision-internally generated information. Consemaker is central to the design of organizations quently, the limitations of humans as proand of the C 3 systems that support them, There-cessors of information and problem solvers, fore, in order to study the properties of alare modeled as a constraint on the total proternative designs, it is necessary to develop cessing activity. This constraint reprea basic model of an interacting decisionmaker.
sents one interpretation of the hypothesis Such a model, appropriate for a narrow but that decisionmakers exhibit bounded ratioimportant class of problems was introduced by nality (March, 1978) . Boettcher and Levis (1982) . In this paper, the work is extended to consider organizations
The task of the organization is to receive consisting of several decisionmakers that form signals from one or many sources, process a team. them, and produce outputs. The outputs could be signals or actions. Implicit in The basic assumption is that a given task, or this model of the organization's function is set of tasks, cannot be carried out by a single the hypothesis that decisionmaking is a twodecisionmaker because of the large amount of stage process, The first is the assessment information processing required and because of of the situation (SA) of the environment, the fast tempo of operations in a tactical sit-while the second is the selection of a resuation. In designing an organizational strucponse (RS) appropriate to the situation. ture for a team of decisionmakers, two issues need to be resolved: who-receives what informa-
The input signals that describe the environtion and who is assigned to carry out which ment may come from different sources and, in decisions. The resolution of these issues degeneral, portions of the signals may be repends on the limited information processing ceived by different members of the organizarate of individual decisionmakers and the temtion. It has been shown by Stabile, Levis po of operations. The latter reflects the rate and Hall (1982) that the general case can at which tasks are assigned to the organization be modeled by a single vector source and a for execution.
set of partitioning matrices that distribute components of the vector signal to the approAn information theoretic framework is used for priate decisionmakers within the organizaboth the modeling of the individual decisiontion, This model is shown in Fig. 1 the proposed model exhibits useful properties from the point of view of studying the Fig. 1 The problem of information information structure of decisionmaking structures for organizations.
organizations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the Many classes of organizational structures can p be represented by Fig. 1 . Consideration in next section, the model of the interacting this paper will be restricted to structures that result when a specific set of interactions third section an organization consisting of are allowed between team members, as shown in a team of two decisionmakers is described analytically. In the fourth section, the Fig. 2 . In this case, each team member is asanalytically. In the fourth section, the signed a specific task, whether it consists of optimal and the satisficing decision strateprocessing inputs received from the external gies are obtained and analyzed. environment or from other team members, for which he is well trained and which he performs again and again for successively arriving inputs. In general, a member of the organization MODEL OF THE INTERACTING can be represented by a two-stage model as ORGANIZATION MEMBER shown in Fig. 2 . First, he may receive signals r from the environment that he processes in the The complete realization of the model for a situation assessment (SA) stage to determine or single decisionmaker (DM) who is interacting select a particular value of the variable z with other organization members and with the that denotes the situation. He may communicate environment is shown in Fig. 3 . The detailhis assessment of the situation to other memed description and analysis of this model, bers and he may receive their assessments in as well as its relationship to previous work, return. This supplementary information may be notably that of Drenick (1976) and Froyd and used to modify his assessment, i.e., it may Bailey (1980), has been presented in Boettcher lead to a different value of z. Possible alterand Levis (1982) . Therefore, only the connatives of action are evaluated in the response cepts and results needed to formulate the selection (RS) stage. The outcome of this promodel of the organization will be described cess in the selection of a local action or dein 
is defined to be the entropy of the input (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) measured in bits per symbol generated. The quantity H(x) can also be interpreted as the uncertainty regarding which value the random variable x will take. If input symbols are generated every T seconds on the average, then T, the 
It is assumed that the algorithms have no I u / \( _sve) variables in common:
Vi,j C {1,2,...,UT} or {1,2,...,V} (4) The subsystem S' is described by a set of variables Fig choice of algorithm f. to process x. There-A fore, each algorithm Is considered to be active or inactive, depending on the internal de-A = EWA _1 cision u. In this paper, it is assumed that S ,z; the algorithms f are deterministic. This in-B i subsystem S by plies that once the input is known and the algorithm choice is made, all other variables in SB B= {W,}; the first part of the SA stage are known. SA which contains the deterministic algorithmA.
If there is no command input v' from other organization members, then the response selection A quantity complementary to the throughput strategy p(vlz) specifies the selection of one G is that part of the input information of the algorithms hj that map z into the output y. The existence of command input v} modwhich is not transmitted by the system S, ifies the decisionmaker's choice v. A final It is called blockage and is defined as choice v is obtained from the function b(v,v'). The latter defines a protocol according to Gb = H(x,',') -G t (6) which the command is used, i.e., the values of v determined by b(v,v') reflect the degree of In this case, inputs not received or rejecoption restriction effected by the command. The ted by the system are not taken into account. overall process of mapping the assessed situaBlockage can also be expressed as the mutual tion z and the command input v' into the final information between the inputs and all the choice'Cv is depicted by subsystem S B in Fig..3. internal variables of S conditioned on the choice P is depicted by subsystem S B in Fig. 3 . The result of this process is a response selecoutput y, i.e., tion strategy p(VlZv') in place of p(vlZ).
The model of the decisionmaking process shown (7) in Fig. 3 may be viewed as a system S consisting of four subsystems: S', the first part of the In contrast to blockage is a quantity that -s A; . B -'describes the uncertainty in the output when SA stage; S ; S ; and S", the second part of the input is known. It may represent noise the RS stage. The inputs to this system S in the output generated within S or it may are x, z', and v' and the output is y. Further-represent information in the output produced more, let each algorithm fi contain a. variaby the system. It is defined as the entropy bles denoted by of the system variables conditionedi on x,.
Wi ii
The conditional entropy is defined as and let each algorithm h. contain a! variables denoted by J X (Z) p(x) I P(Zlx)lg 2 P(zlx)
H that is, has been selected for processing the input
--x and p. is the probability that algorithm Gn= Hx(UW ,.. ,W , ,W ,Z,Z, ,y) (8) hj has ieen selected, i.e., Pi = p(u=i)
The final quantity to be considered is the muand pj p(v=j). The quantities gk repretual information of all the internal and output' sent the internal coordination of the corresvariables of the system S. It reflects all ponding algorithms and depend on the distrisystem variable interactions and can be interbution of their respective inputs. The preted as the coordination required among the quantity H is the entropy of a random varisystem variables to accomplish the processing able that can take one of two values with of the inputs to obtain the output y. It is probability p: defined by
:w, :w 1 :. .:wa :z:z:v:y)(9) cV B Relation (13) states then that the total coordination in system S can be decomposed inThe Partition Law of Information (Conant, 1976) the sum of the internal coordination states that the sum of the four quantities Gt, within each subsystem and the coordination Gb, G, and Gc is equal to the sum on the mardue to the interaction among the subsystems. ginal entropies of all the system variables The subsystem coordinations are given by (internal and output variables):
Eqs. (14) to (17) while the coordination among them is given by Eq. (18) . The coor-G = Gt + Gb + Gn+ Gc (10) dination terms for subsystems S' and S" reflect the presence of switching due to the where internal decision strategies p(u) andp(vlz).
If there is no switching, i.e., if for exam-G = H(w i ) + H(u) + H(z) + H(z) ple p(u=i)=l for some i, then H will be i,j identically zero to all pi and Eq. (14) will + H(v) + H(y) (11) reduce to:
' i When the definitions for internally generated GC g (p(x)) + H(z) information G and coordination G are applied n c and, similarly, Eq. (15) will reduce to: to the specific model of the decisionmaking process shown in Fig. 3 they become G U+j )) gc gc (p (zv=J)) + H1(y). 
to each DM. The expressions for total processing activity G and for its components ( A B can be derived then either from basic principles, or by specializing the expressions + T (x':z') + T-(x',z':v') developed-in the previous section. To z z demonstrate the procedure and, at the same (18) time, keep the exposition brief, an organization consisting of two interacting deciThe expression for G shows that it depends on n isionmakers will be analyzed. the two internal strategies p(u) and p(viz) even though a command input may exist. This implies that the command inDut v' modifies the The specific organizational structure is shown in Fig. 4 , Both decisionmakers #1 and DM's internal decision after p(vJz) has been #2 receive synchronized signals from the determined. environment --they receive different partitions of the input X to the organization. In the expressions defining the system coorditions of the input X to the organization. is the probability that li f Each member processes the external input nation Pi is the probability that algorithm fi through one of his algorithms fi to obtain his partial assessment z of the external siua-12 1 tion. The partial assessments are then com-G
21 b municated to each other (variables z and z1 in Fig. 4 (20) to (27) that ij = {Di D (32) the interactions affect the total activity G of each DM. At the same time, these interof each D. At the sae time, these interIndependent internal decision strategies for actions model the control that is exerted by each DM whether pure or mixed induce a the DMs on each other. These controls are ' ( exerted either directly through the command behavioral strategy (Owen, 1968) for the inputs v' or indirectly through z1 2 and z 2 1. organization
Both decisionmakers in Fig. 4 are subject to {D k ) , D 2 (p)} indirect control. The supplementary situation Given such a behavioral strategy, it is then 12 1 Given such a behavioral strategy, it is then assessment z modifies the assessment z to possible to compute the total processing -1 -1 activity G for each DM: produce the final assessment z . Since z affects the choice of output, it follows that DM 2 G1 = G1(E) ; G2 = G2(A) =G (A'); G = C (A) (34) has influenced the response of DM 1 . Similarly, DM 1 , influences through z 2 1 the response of DM 2 . Alternatively, the distributions on u and v can be specified directly for each decisionmaker. This results in a set of behavioral Direct control is exerted through the command maker. This results in a set of behavioral input from DM1 to DM 2 . The variable v' modistrategies for the organization.
fies the response selection strategy p(v 2 z
2 ) b = p )(v directly. Both direct and indirect control may improve the performance of a DM; they can also (35) degrade it. that includes the set specified by Eq. (33) as well as strategies that are not induced The values of the total processing activities as well as strategies that are not induced 1 2 by mixed internal decision strategies for G and G depend on the choice of internal deeach DM. Then, the total activity G can be cision strategies adopted by DM 1 and DM 2. Decomputed from fine a pure internal decision strategy to be 1 1 2 2 one for which both the situation assessment b G =Gb (36) strategy p(u) and the response selection stra-T tegy p(vjz) are pure, i.e., an algorithm f. is Iese interpretations of the expressions for i the total activity are particularly useful selected with probability one, and an algorithm in modeling the bounded rationality conh. is selected is selected with probability one straint for each decisionmaker and in anaylvzing the organization's performance in when the situation is assessed as being some z: l ng the organization the performance-workload space. where T is the mean symbol interarrival time and F the maximum rate of information proAll other internal decision strategies are mixed cessing that characterizes decisionmaker i (Owen, 1968) and are obtained as a convex combi-This Constraint implies that the decisiont nation of pure strategies: maker must process his inputs at a rate that it as least equal to the rate with which they mn arrive. For a detailed discussion of this k Pk Dk (30) Boettcher and Levis (1982) .
n o As stated earlier, the task of the organiza-2 (P ) = which represents the probability of the organi-The result in Eq. (39) follows from the defzation making the wrong decision in response inition of G i as the sum of the marginal to inputs X. entropies of each system variable, Eq. (11), and the fact that the possible distributions _ SA _ RS _ p(w), where w is any system variable, are elements of a convex distribution space determined by the organization decision strate-
The performance index of the organization can also be obtained as a function of A. Corresponding to each Akl is a value Jkl of the pery' LJ formance index. Since any organization strategy being considered is a weighted sum of (42) associated decision strategies can be used by k,P the organization designer in defining and allocating tasks (selecting the partitioning matrices 7Ti) and in changing the number and Equations (39) and (42) are parametric in the contents of the situation assessment and resprobabilities p and p The locus of all ponse selection algorithms. 2 admissible (J,G ,G ) triples can be obtained The complete model of the team of two decision-by constructing first all binary variations makers with bounded rationality is shown in between pure strategies; each binaryvaria- Fig. 5 . Two problems can be defined: tion defines a line in the three dimensional space (J,G1,G ). These binary variations for (a) Determine the strategies that a specific realization of the model in Fig.4  minimize J; aredrawn in Fig. 6 . Each decisionmaker has only two pure strategies. Therefore, there (b) Determine the set of strategies are four triples that correspond to these for which J < J. pure strategies and four lines that join them under the assumption that one decisionmaker's The first is an optimization problem while the pure strategy remains fixed while the other latter is formulated so as to obtain satisficone considers variations between his two pure ing strategies with respect to a performance strategies. threshold J. Since the bounded rationality constraint for both DMs depends on T, the inter-For this particular example, the second decinal decision strategies of each DM will also sionmaker's strategy does not affect the workdepend on the tempo of operations. The unconload or total processing of the first DM; howstrained case can be thought of as the limitever, the first DM affects both performance ing case when T ' A. and the total activity of the second decisionmaker through his command or direct con-A useful way of describing the properties of trol input. These properties are seen more the solutions to the two problems is by introclosely if the locus of admissible triples is ducing the performance-workload space (J 1 GlG 2 ), projected on the (J,G 1 ) and the (J,G 2 ) planes.
The locus of the admissible triples (J,G ,G z )
The results for the second decisionmaker are is determine by analyzing the functional depen-shown in Fig.7 ; similar results are obtained dence of J, G 1 , and G 2 on the organizationstra-for DM 1 . As expected, these figures are simitegy A, Eq. (33). lar to the ones obtained from the analysis of a the constraint for DM 1 is a plane parallel to (D' ,D,) the G 2 axis and intersecting the G axis at
Similarly, the constraint for DM 2 is a plane 2 22 2 that-intersects the G axis at G sF T. For r fixed values of F m , the bounded rationality constraint is proportional to the tempo of operations. As the tempo of operations increases the G i become smaller and fewer of the potential strategies are feasible.
The solutions of the satisficing problem can be characterized as that subset of feasible solutions for which c·:,~~~~~s
, I ] k,-
The condition (43) defines a plane in the (JG ,G ) space that is parallel to the (G ,G ) plane and intersects the J axis at J. All points on the locus below this plane, which also satisfy the bounded rationality constraints, are satisficing strategies. Fig. 6 The locus of binary variations
While an infinite number of strategies can be of pure strategies for a team satisficing, the difference in total activity of two decisionmakers with two between them can be quite large. This is pure strategies each shown in the shaded region in Fig.7 . The method of analysis presented in this paper is readily extendable to teams of N decisionmakers whose interconnections can be represented by an acyclical graph.
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